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Abstract—In emerging applications, such as intelligent auto-
motive systems, Internet-of-Things (IoT) and industrial control
systems, the use of conventional message authentication codes
(MACs) to provide message authentication and integrity is not
possible due to the large size of the MAC output. A straightfor-
ward yet naive solution to this problem is to employ a truncated
MAC which undesirably sacrifices cryptographic strength in
exchange for reduced communication overhead. In this paper,
we address this problem by proposing a novel approach for
message authentication called Cumulative Message Authentication
Code (CuMAC), which consists of two distinctive procedures:
aggregation and accumulation. In aggregation, a sender generates
compact authentication tags from segments of multiple MACs by
using a systematic encoding procedure. In accumulation, a re-
ceiver accumulates the cryptographic strength of the underlying
MAC by collecting and verifying the authentication tags. Em-
bodied with these two procedures, CuMAC enables the receiver
to achieve an advantageous trade-off between the cryptographic
strength and the latency in processing of the authentication tags.
We have carried out comprehensive evaluations of CuMAC in
two real-world applications: low-power wide-area network and
in-vehicle controller area network. Our evaluation methodology
included simulations as well as a prototype implementation of
CuMAC on a real car.
Index Terms—Message authentication code (MAC); Internet-
of-Things (IoT); Sigfox; Controller area network (CAN).
I. INTRODUCTION
In emerging applications, such as home automation, in-
dustrial controllers and sensor networks, a large number
of energy-constrained computing devices are getting closely
integrated with the existing computer infrastructure through
bandwidth-constrained networks to form the Internet-of-
Things (IoT) [1]. The successful adoption of those applications
will partially depend on our ability to thwart security and
privacy threats, including message forgery and tampering.
Today, message authentication code (MAC) is the most com-
monly used method for providing message authenticity and
integrity in wired/wireless network applications. To employ
MACs in a resource-constrained (i.e., energy and/or bandwidth
constrained) network, we need to consider two problems: the
computational burden on the devices for generating and ver-
ifying the MAC, and the additional communication overhead
incurred due to the inclusion of the MAC in each message
frame/packet. The first problem can be addressed by using
dedicated hardware and cryptographic accelerators [2], [3].
However, the second problem is not as easy to address.
The cryptographic strength of a MAC depends on the
cryptographic strength of the underlying cryptographic prim-
itive (e.g. a hash or block cipher), the size of the MAC
output, and the size and quality of the key. Hence, a conven-
tional MAC scheme typically employs at least a few hundred
bits of MAC output to ensure a sufficient level of crypto-
graphic strength. In energy-constrained networks (e.g., low-
power wide-area network with battery-powered devices) and
bandwidth-constrained networks (e.g., in-vehicle controller
area network), the payload size of each packet is very short
(less than 150 bits in some protocols), and not more than a few
bits can be spared to include an authentication tag associated
with the MAC [1], [4].
The legacy solution for generating a short authentication
tag is to truncate the output of a conventional MAC so that
it fits a message frame/packet [5]–[7]. This type of MAC
is called a truncated MAC. However, the truncated MAC
sacrifices cryptographic strength in exchange for reduced
communication overhead and energy consumption, which may
be undesirable, or even unacceptable, in some applications.
Note that the truncated MAC without sufficient cryptographic
strength renders the application vulnerable to collision attacks
[8]. To enable authentication with enhanced cryptographic
strength, Katz et al. propose the concept of aggregate MAC
where conventional MACs of multiple messages are combined
into one aggregate MAC, and transmitted over successive
packets [9]. Similarly, Nilson et al. propose a compound MAC
which is calculated on a compound of multiple messages,
and distributed over successive packets [4]. However, both
the aggregate and compound MAC schemes incur significant
latency in the verification of the messages because the receiver
needs to receive and process all associated packets before
being able to verify the MAC.
In this paper, we identify two challenges in employing
MACs for resource-constrained networks: (1) incurring min-
imal communication overhead so that the MAC can fit in
a message packet, and (2) ensuring that the cryptographic
strength meets the security need of the application. In this
paper, we propose a novel approach for message authentica-
tion that we refer to as Cumulative Message Authentication
Code (CuMAC) that addresses both of the aforementioned
challenges. In CuMAC, a sender utilizes a procedure called
aggregation through which the sender first divides the full-
sized MAC output of each message into multiple short MAC
segments, and then “aggregates” the MAC segments of multi-
ple messages using a systematic encoding procedure to form
a short authentication tag. This procedure resolves the first
challenge of ensuring low communication overhead.
Further, the receiver utilizes a procedure called accumula-
tion through which it first verifies the MAC segments aggre-
gated into the authentication tag of each received packet, and
then “accumulates” the cryptographic strength by collecting
the verified MAC segments associated with the target mes-
sage. In this procedure, the receiver may incur delay that is
proportional to the accumulated cryptographic strength since
it needs to wait for the relevant tags to be received and
processed. Hence, while the accumulation procedure caters to
the second challenge, it brings up a novel trade-off between the
cryptographic strength and delay. CuMAC enables the receiver
to authenticate the message in real-time with the cryptographic
strength which is commensurate with the size of each tag.
Further, CuMAC enables the authentication with the highest
level of cryptographic strength (which is commensurate with
size of the MAC) after accumulating all segments of the MAC
that covers the message in the associated packets.
The paper’s main contributions are summarized as follows.
1) We propose a novel message authentication scheme
called CuMAC, which meets the security need of
resource-constrained network applications. CuMAC is
an embodiment of two novel concepts that we refer
to as aggregation (which reduces the communication
overhead) and accumulation (which increases the cryp-
tographic strength).
2) We have thoroughly evaluated the effectiveness of
CuMAC through simulations and a prototype implemen-
tation on a real car. Our results illustrate that while
incurring the same communication overhead as the trun-
cated MAC scheme, CuMAC achieves the cryptographic
strength equivalent to the conventional MAC scheme at
the cost of increase in latency.
3) We provide the rigorous security proof for CuMAC.
II. POTENTIAL APPLICATION SCENARIOS
We discuss two suitable application scenarios of CuMAC,
where the constraints of the network—either in terms of
MAC size or energy/bandwidth consumption of the networked
devices—prohibit the use of the conventional MAC scheme.
We highlight that CuMAC can be readily employed in a variety
of other IoT networks (e.g., those employing Constrained
Access Protocol (CoAP) [10] or Message Queue Telemetry
Transport (MQTT) [11]), and its design is not limited by
specific characteristics of these two applications.
A. Low-Power Wide-Area Network (LPWAN)
Many IoT applications (e.g., smart metering and smart
city infrastructure) require a heavily-crowded network of low-
cost energy-constrained battery-operated wireless devices. The
paradigm of LPWAN is aimed at fulfilling these requirements
of IoT networks [1], [5]. Sigfox [12] is one example of a
widely-known LPWAN technology. In Sigfox, each uplink
packet contains a counter, a message (with length between
0 and 96 bits), and an authentication tag (with length between
16 and 40 bits). To enable robust communication over the
unreliable wireless channel, the sender in Sigfox transmits
multiple copies of the same packet sequentially. After trans-
mitting the fixed number of copies of the packet, Sigfox waits
for an acknowledgement from the receiver. In the absence of
the acknowledgement, the packet is considered lost. We note
that Sigfox does not support retransmission of lost packets.
The battery-powered Sigfox devices are expected to have a
service/battery life of several years. As the energy consump-
tion of a Sigfox device is directly proportional to the size of
packet communicated by it, it is imperative to communicate
using short packets to ensure a long battery life. Also, although
the message integrity and authentication are of prime impor-
tance in applications supported by Sigfox [13], it is unfeasible
to communicate the full-sized MAC output due to the small
size of the tag allocated in the Sigfox packet.
B. In-Vehicle Controller Area Network (CAN)
Today’s high-end cars use a hundred or more electronic
control units (ECUs) to enable advanced functionalities, such
as real-time engine control. ECUs in most modern vehicles
communicate with each other over a bandwidth-constrained
wired broadcast channel called the Controller Area Network
(CAN) bus [14], [15]. Because the messages communicated
among ECUs directly affect vital functions of a vehicle,
some of which are safety related (e.g., dynamics control
system [16]), the security and reliability of the CAN bus
and the integrity of the messages on it are critical [3]. We
note that while the state-of-the-art CAN bus supports robust
mechanisms for message acknowledgement and retransmission
of corrupted/lost packets, it does not support any security
mechanism [17]. Several studies have shown that a car’s in-
vehicle network can be compromised through either direct
physical access (e.g., using the on-board diagnostics port)
or a remote connection (e.g., using Bluetooth) to the CAN
bus [18]–[20]. Due to one such vulnerability, Jeep had to
recall 1.4 million vehicles in 2015 [21]. To counter such
attacks and protect messages on the CAN bus, the US National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) recommends
the inclusion of MACs [22].
A CAN packet consists of an 11-bit or a 29-bit identifier
field and a message field with length between 0 and 64 bits.
Except the identifier and message fields, we cannot arbitrarily
change the length or the content of other fields in the CAN
packet as that would make the modified packet incompatible
with the existing CAN protocol. Hence, in the prior art [6],
[23], to realize MAC-based authentication in each packet, the
identifier field is used to accommodate an 18-bit counter,
and the message field is used to accommodate the message
payload as well as the authentication tag. We note although
the design of this modified packet ensures that it is backward-
compatible, inserting a full-sized MAC in the modified packet
is not possible because the maximum allowed length of the
message field in a CAN packet is only 64 bits.
Fig. 1: Packet model employed in CuMAC.
Fig. 2: Schematic of the procedures in the tag generation
algorithm at the sender in CuMAC.
III. OVERVIEW OF CUMAC
A. System Model
We consider an energy-constrained and/or bandwidth-
constrained network (e.g., LPWAN, CAN and Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE) [24]) where a sender needs to transmit security-
critical messages to a receiver using small packets. As shown
in Figure 1, we let the sender employ a packet format which
contains at least three fields: a packet counter, a message,
and an authentication tag. We note that these three fields
are critical for ensuring any secure message authentication
scheme including CuMAC. Hence, if the network protocol
(e.g., Sigfox as discussed in Section II-A) employs these fields
in the conventional packets by design, CuMAC can readily
utilize them; otherwise, the packet contents can be modified
in the target network protocol (e.g., CAN as discussed in
Section II-B) to include these fields.
We assume that there exists a message acknowledgement
mechanism which enables the sender to know if a particular
packet was correctly delivered to the receiver [25]. The ac-
knowledgement mechanism assisted with the packet counter
enables the sender and the receiver to maintain the same
sequence of packets. Note that we do not make any assumption
about the message retransmission mechanism, i.e., the network
may or may not support retransmission. We highlight that in
this paper, we provide Sigfox and CAN as concrete application
scenarios for CuMAC, but our system model is generically
applicable to a resource-constrained network.
B. Design of CuMAC
In the above system model, the sender and the receiver (after
sharing a secret key) communicate a sequence of messages and
employ CuMAC for authentication. CuMAC comprises of two
major algorithms: tag generation and tag verification. In the tag
generation algorithm, the sender computes the authentication
tag through two major steps (Figure 2). In the first step,
the sender generates the MAC of the message, breaks the
MAC into n short segments, and stores them into a segment
array. In the second step, the sender retrieves n segments (one
MAC segment of the current message, and n− 1 segments of
the MACs of the previously transmitted messages) from the
segment array, and aggregates the segments to generate a tag.
Fig. 3: Illustration of the levels of authentication in CuMAC.
For instance, in the illustration shown in Figure 3, an L-bit
MAC is divided into n segments, such that the size of each
segment is l bits, i.e., L = n · l. Then, an authentication tag of
length l bits is computed using the tag generation algorithm
of CuMAC (Figure 2). Finally, in the ith packet, the sender
transmits the message denoted by mi and the authentication
tag denoted by τi. We note that in CuMAC, the n segments
of the MAC of the message mi are aggregated into the n
authentication tags, τi, · · · , τi+n−1, and transmitted in the
corresponding packets.
Having received each packet, the receiver runs the tag
verification algorithm which includes two major steps. In the
first step, the receiver generates an authentication tag of the
received message using the same procedure employed in the
tag generation algorithm. In the second step, the receiver
compares the generated authentication tag with the received
authentication tag. If the authentication tags match, the re-
ceiver accumulates the MAC segments (aggregated in the au-
thentication tag) with the previously received MAC segments
of the corresponding message. For instance, in the illustration
shown in Figure 3, after receiving and verifying each of the n
authentication tags, τi, · · · , τi+n−1, the receiver accumulates
the MAC segments of the message mi (aggregated in those
tags) to reconstruct the underlying L-bit MAC.
C. Authentication Levels in CuMAC
For CuMAC, we define three levels/features of authenti-
cation: (1) real-time authentication, (2) full authentication,
and (3) partially accumulated authentication. Figure 3 also
illustrates the three different levels of authentication, when
applied to message mi. Recall that the MAC of the mes-
sage mi is divided into n segments, and distributed in tags
τi, · · · , τi+n−1.
In this case, the receiver can perform real-time authenti-
cation immediately after receiving message mi by process-
ing the tag τi. With real-time authentication, the receiver
performs authentication without any delay, but it achieves
the lowest cryptographic strength since there is no security
accumulation using the subsequent tags. On the other hand,
the receiver can perform full authentication after receiving
all of the segments of the MAC associated with message mi
in tags τi, · · · , τi+n−1. With full authentication, the receiver
achieves the highest cryptographic strength, but needs to incur
a latency of n− 1 packets. The receiver can perform partially
accumulated authentication by accumulating and processing
tags τi, · · · , τi+r−1, where 1 < r < n. Partially accumulated
authentication enables the receiver to make a trade-off between
cryptographic strength and message verification latency to
meet the security and performance needs of the application.
D. Attack Model
We consider an adversary which aims to forge valid authen-
tication tags for its malicious messages so that it can deceive
the authentication scheme at the receiver. While the adversary
can eavesdrop the communication channel to obtain packets
transmitted by the sender, it does not know the secret key
(used for generating authentication tags) shared between the
sender and the receiver.
Specifically, to break the real-time authentication feature of
CuMAC, the adversary needs to forge a message and a valid
tag. The forgery need to be fresh which means that the sender
has not generated the MAC of the same counter and message
pair using the same shared key, and transmitted them over the
communication channel. To break the partially accumulated
authentication feature of CuMAC with r accumulated seg-
ments, the adversary need to forge a sequence of r messages
with valid tags. In this sequence, the forgery for only the
first message needs to be fresh. Similarly, to break the full
authentication feature of CuMAC, the adversary need to forge
a sequence of n messages with valid tags, where forgery for
at least the first message is fresh.
E. Security Objectives
We convey the cryptographic strength in bits, where a
cryptographic strength of λ bits for a scheme means that for
any adversary making at most 2λ queries or taking at most 2λ
time, the probability of successfully launching an attack on the
scheme is negligibly small [26]. The cryptographic strength
of a conventional MAC depends on three security parameters:
(1) the cryptographic strength of the underlying cryptographic
primitive, (2) the size and quality of the secret key, and (3) the
size of the MAC output. To achieve a cryptographic strength
of λ bits, the minimum size of the key and the MAC output
should be λ bits. In this paper, we present the cryptographic
strength using the size of the MAC output (denoted by L).
From the illustration discussed in Section III-C, we note that
the cryptographic strength of the full authentication depends
on the same three aforementioned security parameters of the
conventional MAC. However, the cryptographic strength of
real-time authentication in CuMAC is limited by the size of
the MAC segment l. Also, the cryptographic strength of the
partially accumulated authentication in CuMAC depends on
the size of the MAC segment l and the number of accumulated
segments r. The security objective of CuMAC is to ensure that
the probability with which an adversary succeeds in breaking
each of the three authentication features is negligible (i.e,
commensurate with the corresponding cryptographic strength).
We will provide formal definition and rigorous proof of
security of CuMAC in Section V.
IV. TECHNICAL DETAILS OF CUMAC
Here, we present the technical details of the algorithms em-
ployed by CuMAC. We also provide an example that illustrates
the generation and verification of the tags in CuMAC.
A. Algorithms
CuMAC is composed of the following algorithms that are
executed by the sender and/or the receiver.
k← KeyGen(1λ)
This probabilistic key generation algorithm is utilized by
the sender and the receiver to obtain the secret key. The
input to this algorithm is the security parameter λ ∈ N, and
the output is the secret key denoted by k. In a resource-
constrained network, this algorithm can be efficiently realized
by leveraging a trusted third party [7], or using an efficient key
predistribution scheme if trusted infrastructure is not available
[27].
σi ←MacGen(k, i,mi)
This deterministic MAC generation algorithm is utilized
by the sender and the receiver (as a sub-algorithm of tag
generation and verification algorithms) to compute the MAC of
a message using the secret key. The inputs to this algorithm are
the secret key k, a counter i and a message mi. This algorithm
outputs the L bits long MAC represented by σi. This algorithm
can be realized using a cipher-based (e.g., AES-CMAC) or
a hash-based (e.g., SHA-3) MAC scheme. In this paper, we
utilize the widely used AES-CMAC [28].
τi ← SegAgg(segArray)
This segment aggregation algorithm is utilized by the sender
and the receiver as a sub-algorithm of tag generation and
the tag verification algorithms, respectively. It takes as input
a two-dimensional array of MAC segments segArray. This
algorithm proceeds as follows. The ith row of segments in
segArray is generated as follows. The L-bit MAC σi is
divided into n segments, such that the size of each segment
is l bits, i.e., L = n · l. The jth segment of σi is represented
by sji , and is extracted from σi as
sji ← (σi)↓[(j−1)·l+1,j·l]. (1)
It means that the bits in sji correspond to the bits from
((j − 1) · l+ 1)th bit to (j · l)th bit in σi. Further, this al-
gorithm extracts n elements from segArray (n− 1 previous
MAC segments and one current MAC segment), and computes
the authentication tag τi as follows.
τi ←
n⊕
j=1,i−j+1>0
sji−j+1. (2)
This algorithm outputs the authentication tag τi.
τi ← TagGen(k, i,mi)
This tag generation algorithm is run by the sender to
generate an authentication tag. It takes as inputs the secret
key k, a counter i and a message mi. It utilizes an array
of MAC segments segTx which is stored and maintained by
the sender. This algorithm proceeds as follows to output the
authentication tag τi.
1) Compute the MAC of the message mi and set it as σi,
i.e., σi ← MacGen(k, i,mi).
2) Divide the MAC σi into n segments as shown in equa-
tion (1) and append the segments to the array segTx.
3) Compute and output the tag τi by aggregating the
segments of MACs in segTx as shown in equation (2),
i.e., τi ← SegAgg(segTx).
After receiving the positive acknowledgment of the delivery
of the packet from the receiver, the sender increments the
packet counter i by one for the next packet. We note that
the packet counter i can be readily employed to handle the
case of a lost packet. The sender gets to know that the ith
packet is lost when it does not receive the acknowledgement
from the receiver or it receives a negative acknowledgement. In
this case, if the sender supports a retransmission mechanism,
the sender simply re-transmits the same packet containing the
same counter i, the same message mi and the same tag τi.
Otherwise, if the sender does not support any retransmission
mechanism, the sender does not increment the packet counter,
removes the ith row (i.e., the most recently appended row) of
segments in segTx, and then proceeds with the tag generation
of the next message.
valid/invalid← TagVerify(k, i,mi, τi)
This verification algorithm is run by the receiver for verify-
ing the authenticity of the received message and tag. It takes
as inputs the secret key k, the received counter i, the received
message mi, and the received tag τi. It utilizes an array of
MAC segments segRx, and an array of number of verified
segments accRx. These arrays are stored and maintained by
the receiver. The ith entry in the array accRx is represented
by ri. To initialize the value of ri in the array accRx, the
receiver sets ri = 0. This algorithm verifies whether the tag τi
is generated using the secret key k. If the verification succeeds,
it outputs the value valid; otherwise, it outputs the value
invalid. This algorithm proceeds as follows.
1) Compute the MAC of the message mi and set it as σ˜i,
i.e., σ˜i ← MacGen(k, i,mi).
2) Divide the MAC σ˜i into n segments as shown in
equation (1) and append the segments to the array
segRx. We note that the counter i ensures that the arrays
segTx at the sender and segRx at the receiver remain
synchronized.
3) Compute the tag τ˜i by aggregating the segments of
MACs in segRx as shown in equation (2), i.e., τ˜i ←
SegAgg(segRx).
4) If τ˜i = τi,
a) Update the array of accumulated MAC segments
accRx, such that for each t ∈ [i − n + 1, i], set
rt = rt + 1.
b) Output the value valid.
5) Otherwise, if τ˜i 6= τi, output the value invalid.
TABLE I: Example illustrating CuMAC with L = 128, n = 4,
and l = 32.
Packet Previous Current
Aggregation of MAC segments Tag
Counter MACs MAC
5 σ2, σ3, σ4 σ5 s
4
2
⊕ s
3
3
⊕ s
2
4
⊕ s
1
5
τ5
6 σ3, σ4, σ5 σ6 s
4
3
⊕ s
3
4
⊕ s
2
5
⊕ s
1
6
τ6
7 σ4, σ5, σ6 σ7 s
4
4
⊕ s
3
5
⊕ s
2
6
⊕ s
1
7
τ7
8 σ5, σ6, σ7 σ8 s
4
5
⊕ s
3
6
⊕ s
2
7
⊕ s
1
8
τ8
B. Instantiation of CuMAC
Table I presents an example of CuMAC. The size of the
tag in each packet is 32 bits (i.e., l = 32). The MAC is
generated using the AES-CMAC algorithm. Hence, the size
of the MAC output is 128 bits (i.e., L = 128), which
provides cryptographic strength of 128 bits. Each MAC is
divided into four segments (i.e., n = 4). This means that the
achievable cryptographic strengths for real-time authentication
and full authentication are 32 bits and 128 bits, respectively. To
simplify the discussion, we limit the discussions to the packets
which are involved in the authentication of the message
transmitted in the fifth packet, m5. In the fifth packet, the
MAC σ5 of the message m5 is computed. To compute the
corresponding tag τ5, the sender aggregates the segment s
1
5 of
the MAC σ5 and the segments of the MACs of the previously
generated messages, σ2, σ3 and σ3. Further, the tags τ6, τ7
and τ8 are computed using the segments s
2
5, s
3
5 and s
4
5 of σ5,
respectively.
When the receiver receives the fifth packet with the message
m5, the successful verification of the tag τ5 enables the real-
time authentication of message m5 with the cryptographic
strength of 32 bits. Next, the receiver receives and verifies the
validity of tags τ6, τ7, and τ8. If all four tags are verified as
valid, the receiver combines the segments s15, s
2
5, s
3
5 and s
4
5—
which are contained in tags τ5, τ6, τ7 and τ8, respectively—
to accumulate the cryptographic strength. This enables the
receiver to perform full authentication of message m5 with
the cryptographic strength of 128 (= 4 × 32) bits. However,
if the receiver is restricted to process the fifth packet only
after receiving the seventh packet due to latency requirements,
it may also perform partially accumulated authentication of
message m5 with a cryptographic strength of 96 bits after
verifying tags τ5, τ6 and τ7. Note that this ability to perform
the partially accumulated authentication is the most unique
feature of CuMAC when compared to the prior art.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we present formal security definition and
proof for CuMAC.
A. Security Definition
The security definition for CuMAC is based on the notion
of unforgeability under chosen message attack (uf-cma). We
present the following uf-cma-r experiment, where the param-
eter r indicates the number of segments accumulated for tag
verification.
Expuf-cma-r
CuMAC
(A, λ, q)
k← KeyGen(1λ)
Invoke an adversary A who can make up to q queries to
the tag generating oracle of CuMAC, OCuMAC(k, ·).
A queries OCuMAC(k, ·) with n arbitrarily chosen mes-
sages and receives their corresponding tags in response.
A outputs a set of n pairs ({mi}
n
i=1 ,{τi}
n
i=1).
Return 1 if valid ← TagVerify (k, i,mi, τi) for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n, and A did not make the query for mi∗ to
OCuMAC(k, ·), where i
∗ = n− r + 1.
Return 0 otherwise.
Using the above experiment, we present the following
security definition where the probability is denoted by Pr.
Definition 1. CuMAC is (t, q, ǫ, r)-uf-cma secure if for any
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A running in
time t, Pr
[
Expuf-cma-r
CuMAC
(A, λ, q) = 1
]
≤ ǫ.
We utilize the above uf-cma-r security model to define
the cryptographic strengths for full, partially accumulated and
real-time authentication. If CuMAC is (t, q, ǫ, n) secure, i.e.,
r = n, then CuMAC is secure in terms of full authentication.
Similarly, if CuMAC is (t, q, ǫ, r) secure for all 1 < r < n,
then the scheme is secure for partially accumulated authenti-
cation; and if CuMAC is (t, q, ǫ, 1) secure, i.e., r = 1, then
the scheme is secure in terms of real-time authentication.
B. Security Proof
Here, we present the security proof for CuMAC which
closely follows the proof for the aggregate MAC scheme [9].
Let CuMAC be instantiated with parameters (l, n), i.e., each
MAC is divided into n segments, each of length l bits.
Theorem 1. For any t, q ∈ N and ǫ > 0, if the under-
lying deterministic MAC generation algorithm, MacGen, is
(t, q, ǫ)-uf-cma secure, then CuMAC with parameters (l, n) is
(t′, q′, ǫ′, r)-uf-cma secure, where
t′ ≈ t, q′ =
q − n+ 1
n
, and ǫ′ = 2l(n−r) · ǫ.
Proof: Let there be an adversary A which succeeds to
create a forgery of an authentication tag for CuMAC with
a non-negligible probability. We construct a simulator S that
interacts with the adversary A and creates a forgery of a MAC
for the MacGen algorithm with a non-negligible probability.
Let CuMAC and the MacGen algorithm utilize the same
secret key k which is unknown to the adversary A. Also, let
the underlying MAC of a message in CuMAC be retrieved
by a query to the MAC generating oracle OMacGen(k, ·). In
this way, S perfectly simulates the tag generating oracle
OCuMAC(k, ·), and hence the uf-cma-r experiment for CuMAC.
Suppose the uf-cma-r experiment for CuMAC returns 1 with
the probability ǫ′ in time t′, where an adversary A outputs
a successful forgery ({mi}
n
i=1 ,{τi}
n
i=1) after q
′ queries to
OCuMAC(k, ·) simulated by S.
To create a forgery of a MAC for the MacGen algorithm,
the simulator S proceeds as follows. Given i∗ = n − r + 1,
the simulator S queries OMacGen(k, ·) for the MAC of mi, and
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Fig. 4: Comparison of CuMAC with the prior art.
obtains the corresponding σi for all i ∈ [1, n] and i 6= i
∗. It
divides each MAC into n segments as shown in equation (1).
Then, for each k ∈ [1, r], it recovers the MAC segment of the
message mi∗ by removing the mask by the MAC segments of
other messages as follows.
ski∗ ← τi∗+k−1 ⊕
n⊕
j=1,j 6=k
sji∗−j+k. (3)
By following the above procedure, the simulator S recovers
r MAC segments. Since i∗ = n − r + 1, the simulator S
cannot recover the segments ski∗ with k ≥ r + 1. Hence, it
makes a random guess for the rest of the n − r segments,
such that s˜ki∗ ←$ {0, 1}
l
for all k ∈ [r + 1, n]. Finally, the
simulator S creates a fresh forgery for the MacGen algorithm,
by concatenating all recovered and guessed segments. The
probability that such forgery is correct is 2−l(n−r).
To achieve the forgery of MacGen as shown above, the
simulator S conducts at most n · q′ queries to OMacGen(k, ·)
to answer q′ queries by A to OCuMAC(k, ·). In order to
compute operations in equations (3), the simulator S conducts
at most n− 1 queries to OMacGen(k, ·) to obtain {τi}
n
i=1,i6=i∗ .
Therefore, if for an adversary A running in time t′ can have
Pr
[
Expuf-cma-r
CuMAC
(A, λ, q′) = 1
]
≤ ǫ′, then S can leverage A to
break the MacGen algorithm, in time t′ plus the time required
to evaluate equation (3), by making n · q′+n− 1 queries, and
with probability 2−l(n−r) ·ǫ′. Hence, if the MacGen algorithm,
is (t, q, ǫ)-uf-cma secure, then CuMAC is (t′, q′, ǫ′, r)-uf-cma
secure, where t′ ≈ t, q′ = q−n+1
n
, and ǫ′ = 2l(n−r)·ǫ.
VI. EVALUATION
We firstly highlight the advantages of CuMAC by compar-
ing it with the prior art. We then evaluate the performance
of CuMAC in an energy-constrained network application and
a bandwidth-constrained network application. These two ap-
plications have very different constraints, but they share a
common requirement—i.e., messages need to be protected
using short tags—that illustrates the utility of CuMAC.
A. Comparison with the Prior Art
We evaluate the performance of CuMAC by comparing it
with three other schemes from the prior art: the truncated
MAC [6], the compound MAC [4], and the aggregate MAC
[9]. For all four schemes, AES-CMAC with a MAC output
of 128 bits is utilized as the underlying MAC algorithm. We
set the size of the tag in all the four schemes to 16 bits. In
the truncated MAC scheme, each MAC is truncated to 16 bits,
and transmitted as the tag. In the compound MAC scheme, a
compound MAC of 128 bits is computed over eight messages.
In the aggregate MAC scheme, an aggregate MAC of 128 bits
is computed by aggregating the MACs of eight messages. The
compound MAC and the aggregate MAC are divided into eight
segments each of size 16 bits, and transmitted in each of the
eight packets as the tag. In CuMAC, each MAC of 128 bits
is divided into eight segments each of size 16 bits, and each
tag is generated by aggregating segments of seven previously
transmitted messages and the current message.
Figure 4a presents the cryptographic strengths of four
schemes versus their authentication delay. In the figure, we
observe that CuMAC provides real-time authentication with
cryptographic strength of 16 bits, which is the same for
truncated MAC. As more packets are received, partially ac-
cumulated authentication is achieved and CuMAC provides
gradually increased cryptographic strength. Finally, CuMAC
provides full authentication with cryptographic strength of 128
bits, which is the same as compound/aggregate MAC.
Most importantly, findings shown in Figure 4a highlight one
critical advantageous attribute of CuMAC. CuMAC enables a
receiver to make a trade-off between (accumulated) crypto-
graphic strength and authentication delay. In some latency-
tolerant applications, this attribute provides the receiver with
operational flexibility to vary the security level and/or packet
processing delay based on particular needs of a protocol or
rules prescribed by network traffic processing policies.
Further, we evaluate the effect of unreliable communication
channel on the four schemes in Figure 4b. The unreliability
of the channel is measured by the packet drop rate which is
equal to the ratio of the lost packets and the total number
of transmitted packets. The performance of each scheme is
measured in terms of the packet processing rate which is
equal to the ratio of successfully authenticated packets at
the receiver and the total number of transmitted packets. We
note that although the packet processing rates in CuMAC and
the truncated MAC are equal (Figure 4b), the cryptographic
strengths for their full authentication are 128 bits and 16 bits,
respectively (Figure 4a).
Further, in Figure 4b, we observe that the com-
pound/aggregate MAC can enable processing of significantly
lower number of packets than CuMAC. This is because in
compound/aggregate MAC, the verification of a MAC requires
the receiver to receive all of the packets that contain the
messages utilized to compute that particular MAC, and loss
of any one of those packets leads to the failure in processing
of other packets. This implies that given the packet drop rate
of ρ, the packet processing rate can be represented by (1− ρ)
in CuMAC, but (1 − ρ)n in the compound/aggregate MAC.
Hence, for a typical packet drop rate ρ = 10% and n = 8,
the packet processing rate in the compound/aggregate MAC is
TABLE II: Parameters utilized for computing the service life
of a sensor node in a Sigfox network.
Battery capacity 8000 mAh × 3600 s/h = 28800 C
Sleep charge 1.3 µA × 86400 s/day = 0.11 C/day
Packet transmission rate 1 packet/h = 24 packets/day
Packet transmission without payload 0.20 C
Payload transmission 0.002 C/bit
around 43% which is an unacceptable rate in a typical network.
B. Advantages in an Energy-Constrained Network
We consider an air quality monitoring system which consists
of a base station and multiple sensors nodes distributed over a
large area [12]. Each sensor node utilizes the Sigfox protocol
to send the air quality data to the base station once in every
hour [29]. The data is examined at the base station and
finally made available to the responsible authorities. In this
application scenario, there are two important performance
requirements—(1) service life: each battery-operated sensor
node needs to operate for a few years independently without
any physical access which means that the network is energy-
constrained; and (2) robust authentication: message authen-
tication scheme is needed to ensure verification of received
data despite losing some packets. Note that in this scenario,
the latency requirement is not stringent as the data is collected
and analyzed at the base station with some inherent delay.
1) Service Life: We evaluate the effect of appending an
authentication tag in each packet on the service life of a sensor
node, which is equal to its battery life. To compute the service
life, we utilize the charge consumption data from a Sigfox
compliant transceiver IC produced by ON Semiconductor [30].
Table II presents the parameters utilized in the computation
of the service life. We employ two 1.5 V Alkaline C batteries
connected in series. Each battery holds a charge of 8000 mAh.
The transmission time in every hour is limited to 2 seconds,
and hence the device is considered to be in sleep almost all the
time. We ignore the battery self discharge in this calculation.
Figure 5 presents the service life of a sensor node for
different sizes of message and authentication tag. We observe
that by appending authentication tags in transmitted packets,
each sensor node consumes a significantly more energy on
data transmission which shortens the service life. Specifically,
we consider a 48-bit message without tag as the benchmark
which results in the service life of around 11 years. Figure 5
illustrates that in comparison to this benchmark, utilizing the
conventional MAC of size 128 bits results in a significant
loss of around 45% of service life. However, CuMAC can
utilize the 16-bit tag in each packet without compromising
the cryptographic strength (128 bits) for full authentication,
and with a modest (around 10%) reduction in the service life
as compared to the benchmark. Hence, for the LPWAN (like
Sigfox) where the size of the tag in each packet is usually
limited due to the energy constraints, we assert that CuMAC
is a much more viable solution for message authentication than
the full-size conventional MAC.
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Fig. 5: Effect of size of message and authentication tag on the
service life of a sensor node in a Sigfox network.
TABLE III: Distribution of size and period of messages in
CAN.
Size 1 byte 2 bytes 4 bytes 6 bytes
Share 35 % 49 % 13 % 3 %
Period 5 ms 10 ms 20 ms 50 ms 100 ms 200 ms 1000 ms
Share 7 % 25 % 25 % 3 % 20 % 1 % 19 %
2) Robust Authentication: Recall that in Sigfox, the sender
becomes aware of the lost packet when it does not receive the
acknowledgement from the receiver. Since Sigfox does not
support retransmission of packets, the authentication scheme
needs to be robust against packet drops. In CuMAC, the packet
counter readily handles such cases, and ensures synchroniza-
tion of packets between the sender and receiver. This implies
that with CuMAC, all received messages can be authenticated
with the cryptographic strength of 128 bits, albeit with some
delay. However, in this application, the truncated MAC cannot
provide high cryptographic strength as shown in Figure 4a,
and the compound/aggregate MAC cannot provide robust
authentication to all received packets as shown in Figure 4b.
C. Advantages in a Bandwidth-Constrained Network
We consider the CAN bus as an illustrative bandwidth-
constrained network. We simulate the performance of the
CAN bus when the authentication tag along with the message
is inserted in the CAN packets. Table III illustrates the
distribution of the size and the period of messages utilized in
the simulation. This distribution is based on the open-source
benchmark presented by Kramer et al. [31]. The bus speed
utilized in the simulation is 500 kbps. In the simulation, we let
the maximum size of the message to be 6 bytes which means
2 bytes (16 bits) of tag can be readily inserted in the data field.
An 18-bit packet counter is inserted in the CAN identifier field
[6], [23]. To communicate the full 128-bit tag, an ECU may
employ the trailing MAC scheme in which the ECU needs to
transmit two extra packets with the tag for each packet with
the message [32]. Recall that a maximum of 64 bits of tag can
be transmitted in one CAN packet. In the above scenario, we
evaluate two performance metrics of the CAN bus: bus load
and message processing delay.
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Fig. 6: Effect of size of message and authentication tag on the
CAN bus load.
1) Bus Load: The bus load is a critical parameter for
evaluating the overall latency performance of the CAN bus.
Typically, the CAN bus load is between 30 % to 40 %, but
with systematic approaches based on scheduling analysis, the
bus load can be increased to around 80 % [33]. The bus load
is directly proportional to the number of supported messages
on the CAN bus. A high bus load may increase the latency of
messages that may lead to problems, such as car functions
being delayed and high possibility of communication fault
situations [17]. Hence, it is critical to keep the bus load low.
Figure 6 illustrates the effect of increasing the number
of messages and inserting authentication tags in the CAN
packet on the CAN bus load. We observe that at a typical
bus load of 40 %, the number of supported messages without
authentication is 60. While maintaining the same bus load,
CuMAC with a 16-bit tag is able to support 45 messages, but
a trailing MAC with a 128-bit tag supports only 12 messages.
Further, considering the maximum bus load of 80 %, the
maximum number of messages supported by the bus with a 16-
bit tag is 91, but that with a 128-bit tag is only 27. This means
that to support 91 messages, a vehicle needs only one CAN
bus when the messages are authenticated using CuMAC, but it
needs three CAN buses when the messages are authenticated
using a full-size MAC. Note that increasing the number of
CAN buses increases the overall cost of the vehicle.
2) Message Processing Delay: Message processing delay is
an important design metric for the CAN bus which supports
safety-critical functions of a vehicle [33]. The major compo-
nents of this delay includes the delay in the generation of the
authentication tag at the sender, communication of the CAN
packet over the bus, and then verification of the authentication
tag at the receiver. We note that although the CAN bus enforces
strict message processing deadlines, the individual communi-
cation delay encountered by each message type (which denotes
all messages with the same message identifier) on the bus
can vary significantly between 5 ms and 1000 ms [17]. Also,
recall that CuMAC supports accumulation of cryptographic
strength as per the flexible delay requirement as shown in
Figure 4a. This implies that with CuMAC, some message types
can be authenticated with high cryptographic strength. Unlike
CuMAC, the truncated MAC does not support accumulation
Fig. 7: Prototype connected to a car’s CAN bus.
of cryptographic strength, and the compound/aggregate MAC
cannot provide real-time authentication guarantee which is
essential for the CAN bus.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
We discuss the results from the experiments performed with
a prototype implementation. These results are also utilized to
compare CuMAC with the MAC schemes in the prior art.
A. Details of the Prototype Implementation
Figure 7 illustrates the prototype implementation and the
setup that were used for running our experiments. The pro-
totype implementation comprised of two ECU prototypes
connected to the on-board diagnostics (OBD) port of the CAN
bus (with the bus speed of 500 kbps) of a 2016 Toyota Corolla
LE. The ECU prototype consisted of an Arduino UNO board
and a Seeed studio CAN shield. The Arduino UNO board
was used to emulate the controller unit of an ECU, and the
Seeed studio CAN shield worked as the interface between the
Arduino UNO board and the CAN bus. The Arduino UNO
board utilizes an Atmel ATmega328P chip, which includes
a low-power 8-bit micro-controller running at 16 MHz clock
speed along with a 32 KB flash memory and a 2 KB RAM.
These specifications of the ECU prototype are representative
of a typical state-of-the-art automotive-grade controller [34].
With the above experimental setup, we compared five
schemes: the trailing MAC, the truncated MAC, the compound
MAC, the aggregate MAC and CuMAC. For all five schemes,
AES-CMAC with a MAC output of 128 bits was utilized
as the underlying MAC algorithm. We utilized an open-
source cryptography library [35] to implement AES-CMAC.
We found that the computation time (calculated by averaging
the computation time over 1000 executions) of generating a
MAC was 0.786 ms. For the truncated MAC, the compound
MAC, the aggregate MAC and CuMAC, the size of the tag was
set to 16 bits, and the message and tag were inserted into the
data field of the same CAN packet. For the trailing MAC, the
128-bit MAC was split into two tags of 64 bits, and inserted
into the data fields of two consecutive CAN packets. These
packets were transmitted immediately after the CAN packet
containing only the message.
To evaluate the delay performance, we utilized one ECU
prototype (called Tx-ECU) to transmit 6-byte messages with
the tags on the CAN bus, and another ECU prototype (called
Rx-ECU) to measure the end-to-end delay. In the experiment,
the Rx-ECU requested the Tx-ECU (through an external
synchronization channel) to send a message, and started the
timer. The Rx-ECU stopped the timer after verifying the tag
and authenticating the message. The delay was measured as
the time between starting the timer and stopping the timer.
Also, we let the message processing deadline for the message
type utilized in the experiment be 50 ms. Note that the
processing deadline represents the time within which the
authentication tags corresponding to the message are expected
to be generated, communicated and verified.
B. Results
Table IV summarizes the results from the experiments.
The end-to-end delay shown in the table is the worst case
delay in processing 1000 CAN messages. The table also
presents the cryptographic strengths for real-time, full and
partially accumulated authentication in each scheme. From
Table IV, we observe that: (1) In comparison to the truncated
MAC, additional 112 bytes of storage is required to store
the segments of the MACs of seven previous messages in
CuMAC; (2) Unlike the trailing MAC, CuMAC does not
increase the bus load significantly; (3) Unlike the compound
MAC and the aggregate MAC, CuMAC provides real-time
authentication; and (4) In comparison with the truncated
MAC, the compound MAC and the aggregate MAC schemes,
CuMAC provides higher cryptographic strength for partially
accumulated authentication within the processing deadline.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a novel concept for message authentication
that we refer to as cumulative MAC (CuMAC). CuMAC incurs
low communication overhead, and provides high cryptographic
strength which is commensurate with the delay in authen-
tication. Our promising simulation and experimental results
show that CuMAC provides significant advantages over the
MAC schemes in the prior art when deployed in a number
of emerging applications, including those that run on energy-
constrained or bandwidth-constrained networks.
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